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of the Foreign Fighter 
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Making Sense of an Evolving 
Phenomenon  
 
 
In light of Islamic State’s decreasing military power and growing emphasis 
on a decentralised operational strategy, the threat posed by foreign fighters 
is shifting, with some aspects becoming less threatening as others become 
more salient. This Policy Brief provides a concise outline of four main 
threats related to the issue of foreign fighters with the aim of clarifying the 
parameters of the phenomenon in its current manifestation: the travel of 
foreign fighters, their return to their countries of residence, the threat 
posed by lone actors and sympathisers who carry out attacks at home, and 
finally, an increasing polarisation of society. It is argued that policymakers 
need to take into account the second and third order effects that targeting 
one of these aspects may have on the others in order to effectively counter 
a multi-dimensional phenomenon.  
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Introduction 
 
Increased terrorist activity in Europe over the past few years, termed by some a “crisis 
of jihadism”,1 has kept policymakers across the continent busy. As argued by a Europol 
report in November 2016, “[t]he EU is currently witnessing an upward trend in the scale, 
frequency and impact of terrorist attacks in the jurisdictions of Member States”.2 What 
began, for Europe, mainly as a problem of foreign fighter travel has, against the 
backdrop of concurrent sociopolitical phenomena, slowly broadened to include many 
other aspects – terrorist attacks on domestic soil, political polarisation of groups within 
society, anti-immigration and anti-Muslim sentiment, and the rise of populism and 
nativist movements, to name a few.   
 
As the foreign fighter phenomenon further evolves, policymakers need to adapt to a 
changing threat. With a decreasing number of foreign fighters leaving Western Europe, 
some aspects of the foreign fighter phenomenon may become less threatening as 
others become more salient. This Policy Brief provides a concise outline of four threats 
related to the issue of foreign fighters, with the aim of clarifying the parameters of the 
phenomenon in its current manifestation: the travel of foreign fighters, their return to 
their countries of residence, the threat posed by lone actors and sympathisers who 
carry out attacks at home, and finally, an increasing polarisation of society. The main 
argument set out in this Policy Brief is that these four aspects of the threat are distinct 
but interconnected, and form part of the same continuum. Thus, changes in one of the 
aspects have an impact on the others, and policies designed to counter one aspect of 
the foreign fighter threat may have second and third order effects on the other aspects. 
As such, policies need to take into account the linkages between the four threat 
dimensions in order to be effective. 
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The Travel of Foreign Fighters to Conflict 
Theatres 
 
With so-called Islamic State (IS) losing territory in Syria and Iraq, the number of foreign 
fighters leaving to join the group is decreasing: U.S. intelligence assessments suggested 
that the number of foreign fighters crossing the border from Turkey fell from 2000 each 
month to about 50 in September 2016.3 Likewise, governments in France, Germany, 
Belgium and the UK have reported fewer foreign fighters leaving their territories 
compared to previous years.4 However, as of October 2016, 15,000 foreign fighters 
were estimated to remain in Syria and Iraq.5 Similarly, as of April 2016, approximately 
2000 foreign fighters who travelled from European countries were thought to remain 
in conflict zones.6 Hence, the question of why foreign fighter travel poses a threat 
remains relevant.  
 
The primary fear of governments is that the travel of foreign fighters contributes to 
their radicalisation and the acquisition of capabilities to carry out terrorist attacks.7 Not 
only may foreign fighters learn how to handle weapons and explosives, or to use 
techniques such as beheadings or suicide bombings, they also establish links to jihadist 
organisations worldwide.8 Perhaps most significantly, foreign fighters commit severe 
crimes in conflict theatres and contribute to the use of terrorism in the wars they join.9 
Infamously, it was British citizen Mohammed Emwazi who beheaded the American 
journalist James Foley in August 2014 in the first such video released by IS.10 Hereafter, 
videos emerged showing the decapitation of journalists and aid workers and 
documenting the mass murder of Syrian and Kurdish soldiers as well as Coptic and 
Ethiopian Christians.11 In many of these videos, foreign fighters from all over the world 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
  
– including European countries – were featured12, contributing to the realisation that 
Western foreign fighters were committing atrocities abroad.13 While the threat posed 
by foreign fighters to Western citizens has often been the primary focus of Western 
governments, the violence they commit against the population of their host nations 
must not be overlooked. Indeed, according to the University of Maryland’s Global 
Terrorism Database, the majority of victims of Islamist terrorism worldwide over the 
past 15 years have been Muslims.14  
 
With IS’ power in Syria and Iraq decreasing, foreign fighters may also choose to travel 
to third countries and join other conflicts in places where thorough surveillance is 
impossible, as is the case with Libya, which has seen an increased influx of foreign 
fighters over the past two years.15  
 
The Return of Foreign Fighters to their 
Countries of Residence 
 
With IS’ territorial defeat in Iraq and Syria increasingly within reach, officials in Europe 
are worried about a surge of returning foreign fighters. The newly-appointed EU 
Commissioner for the Security Union, Julian King, recently warned that, “[r]e-taking the 
Islamic State stronghold in northern Iraq can lead to a scenario in which violent 
militants would return to Europe. […] This is a very serious threat and we must be 
prepared to face it”.16 Similarly, EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator Gilles de Kerchove 
cautioned that the EU would struggle to handle the predicted 1,500-2,000 foreign 
fighters that may return if ISIS is driven out of its strongholds in Mosul and Raqqa.17 As 
of April 2017, approximately 20 to 30 percent foreign fighters had left Iraq and Syria,18 
and, as of April 2016, an estimated 30 percent of the EU foreign fighter contingent at 
the time had already returned to their countries of residence, equalling about 1,200 
people.19  
 
Motivations of returning foreign fighters are diverse. While some are disillusioned with 
terrorist practices and life in conflict zones, others may return with the aim of carrying 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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out terrorist attacks, with reports suggesting that IS may systematically export terror 
cells to Europe.20 Indeed, the November 2015 attacks in Paris as well as the attacks in 
Brussels in March 2016 were carried out by IS returnees, underscoring the threat of 
capable and radicalised fighters forced to relocate as IS progressively loses control over 
its territory. Yet another group of returnees, as argued by Clarke and Amarasingam, 
could be termed the “disengaged but not disillusioned”.21 Those include fighters who 
have returned from the battlefield for pragmatic reasons, such as family events or 
battle fatigue, while still subscribing to the overall jihadi ideology.  
 
The threat of returning foreign fighters is further compounded by the refugee crisis: 
although it cannot be generalised that terrorists systematically hide among the flow of 
refugees when trying to enter Europe,22 the fact that several of the perpetrators of the 
Paris attacks in November 2015 did enter Europe by posing as refugees highlights the 
threat posed by limited control over the migratory flow.23  
 
In addition, returnees may also pose a threat if they do not plan to carry out attacks 
themselves, but initiate or engage in logistical, financial, or recruitment cells, or become 
leaders in extremist societies.24 More charismatic and educated returnees, for instance, 
may have a status as bridge builders, developing strategies for transnational 
recruitment. More practically, returnees may be involved in the facilitation of travel of 
new foreign fighters.25 
 
It is important to note that returnees who carry out attacks in their countries of 
residence are a small minority of cases. Analysing the role of foreign fighters in Western 
terrorist plots, Thomas Hegghammer and Petter Nesser found that approximately 1 in 
360 returnees perpetrated an attack after their return.26 Conversely, a study by German 
intelligence services found that approximately half of German returnees remained 
engaged in extremist or Salafist environments.27 Hence, while the export of terror may 
not be the primary goal of most returnees, they may continue to pose a threat mainly 
by upholding and performing secondary functions within extremist networks.  
 
Security services of EU countries will need to identify which returnees continue to pose 
a threat and develop targeted strategies to counter that threat. With some services 
more able to deal with returnees than others,28 countering the threat of returning 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
  
foreign fighters on an EU level will prove challenging, and motivated fighters may try to 
exploit free movement within the Schengen borders to avoid detection.   
 
Attacks by Lone Actors and IS Sympathisers 
 
With its fortunes decreasing in Syria and Iraq, IS has shifted its strategy to increasingly 
target Western countries by calling on its supporters in the West to carry out attacks on 
soft targets in their home countries.29 Lone actors, sleeper networks and home-grown 
radicalised individuals who do not join terrorist organisations abroad have been 
identified as a risk by European officials.30 As EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator De 
Kerchove confirmed, “[i]t would be a big mistake to just believe that the threat is coming 
from outside. We have a lot of people prone to radicalisation inside Europe”.31 The 
threat of lone actors and sympathisers crystallised after the attacks on the satirical 
magazine Charlie Hebdo in January 2015, 32  in which one of the perpetrators was 
prevented from traveling to Syria to join IS prior to the attack. Since then, attacks 
perpetrated by individuals who had not previously fought with IS abroad have become 
more common: the Nice attack in July 2016, attacks in the German cities of Ansbach 
and Würzburg in the same month, the attack on a Berlin Christmas market in December 
2016, and the London Parliament attack in March 2017 are examples of sympathisers 
carrying out attacks in Europe on behalf of IS without previously having fought with the 
organisation in foreign conflict theatres.  
 
Plots by IS sympathisers can be considered a threat for two reasons: they are more 
frequent and more likely to come to execution than plots involving returned foreign 
fighters.33 At the same time, it is difficult for security services to track the activities of 
such individuals, making their behaviour highly unpredictable.  
 
Increasingly, IS has sought to exploit this weakness by calling on its supporters to carry 
out attacks at home if they cannot travel to the caliphate. In May 2016, a message by IS 
spokesperson Abu Mohammed Al-Adnani rallied supporters to “[g]et prepared, be 
ready ... to make it a month of calamity everywhere for the non-believers ... especially 
for the fighters and supporters of the caliphate in Europe and America”.34 
 
This has been accompanied by articles in IS propaganda giving instructions on how to 
carry out attacks, such as the “Just Terror” section in Rumiyah, IS’ latest English language 
publication, and instructional videos, such as “How to slaughter the disbelievers”, 
released by IS in November 2016.35  
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Beyond disseminating propaganda material that calls on supporters to carry out 
attacks, IS is believed to rely on a network of “virtual planners”36 to groom remote 
sympathisers into potential attackers and transmit operational and technical 
knowledge. The attack on a priest in the French town of St.-Étienne-du-Rouvray in July 
2016, for instance, is thought to have been directed by a French member of IS’ virtual 
planning cadre. This strategy of relying on facilitators to inspire and direct attacks 
remotely may become more central to IS’ modus operandi in the future, due to the 
organisation’s increasing need to adapt to territorial loss.   
 
Social Polarisation 
 
High profile terrorist attacks targeting European cities, the refugee crisis and 
concomitant rise of populist sentiment across Europe are creating societal fault lines 
across the continent. Terrorist activities of Europeans on European soil, in particular, 
are thought to negatively affect cohesion in society, fostering extremism and a vicious 
circle of violence and counter-violence.37  
 
In 2016, public opinion polls continued to rate immigration and terrorism as the most 
important issues facing the EU at present, far ahead of socioeconomic issues such as 
unemployment, the economic situation and crime. 38  Examining the perceived link 
between migration and terrorism, another poll found that, in eight out of 10 European 
nations surveyed, 50 percent of the population or more believes that incoming 
refugees increase the likelihood of terrorism in their country.39 
 
Security concerns connected to terrorism and migration have also highlighted the 
divisions between right and left-wing parts of society: people placing themselves on the 
right of the ideological spectrum have been found to hold more negative attitudes 
toward Muslims and minorities in general, to be more concerned about refugees and 
to show more scepticism with regard to a diverse society.40 This attitude manifests itself 
in the rise of populist political parties and groups, which cater to anti-Muslim sentiment 
through central aspects of their platforms. For instance, The German Party Alternative 
für Deutschland – polling as the third-strongest party in the country at the time of 
writing41 – has recently confirmed its stance on the matter, adopting the telling phrase 
“Islam is not part of Germany” in its manifesto.42  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
  
 
It is important to recognise that these tensions in society may foster radicalisation. 
Among many other drivers,43  the radicalisation process among EU foreign fighters 
appears to be related to the “secular nature” of Western European countries in 
combination with “a sense of marginali[s]ation among immigrant communities”. 44 
Increased societal tensions can exacerbate this sense of marginalisation, especially 
when mainstream political voices adopt populist rhetoric in order to secure right-wing 
political support.  
 
 
The Interconnectedness of the Four 
Threats 
 
The four threat dimensions should be acknowledged as mutually re-enforcing parts of 
the same problem. Tackling them thus requires consideration of the unwanted impact 
that policies targeting one may have on the others. 
 
For instance, countering the travel of foreign fighters comes with serious challenges. If 
policy only aims at preventing individuals from traveling to Syria and Iraq, for instance 
by revoking their passports, the risk that some of those people prepare terrorist attacks 
at home as lone actors remains. Countering lone actor terrorism is, in turn, particularly 
challenging for intelligence services: lone actors’ actions are difficult to discern, as they 
rely on little communication with others. Similarly, differentiating between extremists 
who actually plan to carry out an attack and those who do not can be problematic.45 
Countering one threat dimension – foreign fighter travel – thus merely shifts the 
problem, making another threat dimension – terrorism by lone actors or sympathiser 
groups – more salient.  
 
Other suggested policies attempt to counteract the foreign fighter threat by allowing 
individuals to leave but not to return. For instance, the mayor of the Dutch city 
Rotterdam, Ahmed Aboutaleb, suggested that individuals should not be stopped from 
traveling to Syria and Iraq in order to join IS, as long as they give up their Dutch 
passports, thereby preventing them from returning to the country.46 Although this may 
seem to solve the threat posed by radicalised individuals at home, it does not address 
the possibility that a person may further radicalise abroad and plan to carry out or 
facilitate attacks in their countries of residence or in third countries. It likewise ignores 
the threat that such a policy would effectively legitimise the export of individuals 
contributing to international violence and terrorism in foreign conflict theatres. 
Additionally, foreign fighters who are not allowed to return home may move to a third 
country and organise themselves in a place where thorough surveillance is impossible. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Such dynamics have already been witnessed in Libya47 and are expected in the case of 
Tunisia in the future. 48  And even if foreign fighters resettle temporarily to third 
countries, it is likely that they will retain some links back to their original countries of 
residence. 
 
Trade-offs also exist in how to deal with returning foreign fighters. States have generally 
adopted a variety of policy measures targeting returned foreign fighters, ranging from 
administrative, to preventive, rehabilitative and criminal justice measures.49  Out of 
these, restrictive, security-centred measures, mostly found in the administrative and 
criminal justice domains, have so far dominated the policy response in European 
countries. 50  While a number of rehabilitation and reintegration programmes exist 
across EU countries, there is a lack of knowledge on the success of such programmes 
in reducing terrorism-related recidivism, mainly due to a lack of evaluation research.51 
Administrative measures, such as travel bans, area restrictions, reporting requirements 
and restrictions on the possession of communication devices, have increasingly been 
instruments of choice for governments faced with difficulties in obtaining evidence of 
criminal behaviour sufficient for prosecution.52 While these measures have widely been 
criticised for infringing on individual human rights, 53  they can also increase social 
polarisation as Muslim groups may feel that their communities are the ones suffering 
most from such human rights infringements. Beyond these concerns, the adoption of 
security-centric measures that prevent reintegration of foreign fighters may actually 
make matters worse in the long run. In a recent study of past foreign fighter cohorts, 
Malet argues that most foreign fighters reintegrate if given the chance to do so, and 
that policies of home and host states preventing reintegration are the primary cause 
for persistent military activity of past jihadist fighters.54  
 
Conversely, if policymakers predominantly emphasise preventative and rehabilitative 
solutions to deal with returned foreign fighters, they may risk losing political support in 
Europe’s increasingly polarised societies and inadvertently push constituents into the 
arms of right-wing political parties across Europe advocating for a tougher stance on 
terrorism. Thus, such an approach may increase social polarisation, which, in turn, can 
indirectly lead to more radicalisation, as Muslim communities feel increasingly 
marginalised. Naturally, the opposite holds true as well: politicians emphasising 
security-centric approaches to deal with returnees may appease right-wing voters but 
alienate Muslim communities and left-wing voters in the process.   
 
Conclusion 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
  
 
As the previous analysis has shown, defining the problem in a one-dimensional way – 
as mainly concerning either foreign fighter travel, returnees, lone actors or social 
polarisation – not only disregards the dynamics at play but, more importantly, renders 
potential remedies ineffective. The four-dimensional model presented in this Policy 
Brief aims to provide policymakers with an analytic lens through which to view the 
phenomenon, helping to highlight not just the different dimensions of the threat but 
the ways in which they are interconnected. As such, the only way to protect society from 
this increasing threat is to adopt a holistic approach that takes into account and 
addresses the multiple dimensions. Policymakers need to realise that a focus on 
security also entails preventative and rehabilitative programmes, as these counter 
different threat dimensions of the phenomenon as a whole. Likewise, successful 
counter-terrorism strategies need to address both the local and international level: the 
surveillance of homegrown networks and sympathisers on one side and cooperation 
with third states and improved border control mechanisms beyond the EU on the other 
side are equally important. This also holds true for the ‘soft approaches’ to the 
phenomenon: community engagement on the local level needs to be implemented 
alongside larger counter-narrative strategies targeting distinct parts of terrorist groups’ 
audiences.55 
 
Advocating a holistic approach to counter the threat posed by foreign fighters is not 
new; why then, are states still struggling to coordinate the different aspects of their 
counter-terrorism policies? Challenges to implementing such an approach lie, for 
instance, in their multi-agency character. When policymakers deal with problems as 
they arise, knee-jerk efforts led by one stakeholder may supersede multi-agency 
planning. Institutionalised communication between different government actors, 
between government and civil society, as well as with municipalities, is therefore 
paramount to ensuring that efforts are being coordinated to tackle the threat from all 
sides and on all levels of governance. Similarly, a comprehensive approach relies on 
proactive policymaking, taking into account future trends and developments, rather 
than just providing short-term solutions to present threats. Failure to adopt a holistic 
approach will, at best, simply not provide protection from all aspects of the threat, and, 
at worst, fail to identify both the unintended consequences of one-dimensional policy 
approaches and the displacement effect on terrorist actions. 
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